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THE MODES AND TENSES OF LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING,
AND WHAT To Do ABOUT THEM IN LEGAL EDUCATION
THOMAS D. BARTON*
Legal problems are addressed in at least three basic ways, or
modes, each of which is associated with a particular "tense": (1)
through judgment, an authoritative decision pronounced by an em-
powered third party concerning the legal significance of past behav-
iors;1 (2) through consent, a "present tense" resolution in which the
parties to a legal concern resolve it privately by negotiated or medi-
ated agreement; 2 and (3) through prevention, a future-oriented process
that designs contracts, legal arrangements, compliance regimes, edu-
cation and training programs, organizational structures, or even physi-
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law, and Coordinator, Na-
tional Center for Preventive Law. Ph.D., Cambridge University, 1982; J.D., Cornell
Law School, 1974; B.A., Tulane University, 1971. This Essay incorporates and
builds on my presentation, Thomas D. Barton, Integrating Problem-Solving and
Problem Prevention into an Existing Law School Curriculum, Presentation at the
2002 ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Annual Meeting,
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/lapsfbartonintegrate.pdf [hereinafter Barton, Curricu-
lum]. The author wishes to thank Professors Edward A. Dauer and Katharine Rosen-
berry for their most helpful comments on this manuscript.
1. "[J]udgment, the determination or decision of a court; the expression by a
judge of the reasons for his decision." THE LAW DICTIONARY 226 (Amy B. Brann
ed., Anderson Publ'g Co. 7th ed. 1997); "[J]udgment.... A court's final determina-
tion of the rights and obligations of the parties in a case." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 858 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Legal problems are resolved consensually through a growing variety of al-
ternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. For a thoughtfully constructed set
of readings about the philosophy and early development of ADR, see CARRIE J.
MENKEL-MEADOW, LELA PORTER LOVE, ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER & JEAN R.
STERNLIGHT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL 3-58
(2005). See also Symposium, Dispute Resolution: Raising the Bar and Enlarging
the Canon, 54 J. LEGAL EDuC. 4 (2004).
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cal environments so as to keep legal risks from erupting into injuries
or legal liability. 3 Far more legal problems are resolved consensually
or prevented from arising in the first place than are judged in formal
litigation or arbitration. 4 Most legal processes, in other words, are re-
solved in the present or future tense. Yet when explaining legal doc-
trine or even exploring legal theory, most law school classes continue
to rely on reported cases, which are primarily past-tense resolutions
resulting in judgments. 5 The reasons for this are apparent. Legal judg-
3. "Preventive Law" as a distinct approach to lawyering was first formulated
by Louis M. Brown in his 1950 seminal work by that same name. Louis M. BROWN,
PREVENTIVE LAW (1950). Throughout the second half of the century, Brown pub-
lished many works addressed both to lawyers and to the lay public. E.g., LOUIS M.
BROWN, How To NEGOTIATE A SUCCESSFUL CONTRACT (1955). Brown's work was
carried forward by other lawyers and academics, especially Prof. Edward A. Dauer,
with whom Brown collaborated in the treatise LOuIS M. BROWN & EDWARD A.
DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS: MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL
PROCESS (1978) [hereinafter PLANNING BY LAWYERS].
As developed by Brown and Dauer, Preventive Law focuses on the tech-
niques and professional responsibility of a practicing lawyer when engaging with
clients as an advisor and planner, rather than as an advocate. Primary in that ap-
proach are the ideas of regular meetings with clients and the development of check-
lists so that business and life events can be undertaken with minimal risk of prob-
lems. See, e.g., Louis M. Brown, Another Dictionary Definition of Preventive Law,
42 J. ST. B. CAL. 867 (1967); Louis M. Brown, LegalAudit, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 431
(1965). I broaden Brown's ideas by urging analysis of the social and non-social en-
vironments in which the client's risks are embedded. Mine is a more explicitly be-
havioral and systemic perspective.
4. Only about five percent of grievances result in a legal filing. Richard E.
Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture, 15 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 525, 544 (1980-1981), cited in LEONARD L. RISKm
ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 9 (3d ed. 2005). Further, among filings,
"[flewer than 5 percent of all cases commenced in the federal courts go to trial, and
a sizable number of the remainder are settled during trial or even at the appellate
stage." STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 39 (6th ed. 2004).
5. Louis Brown was also a pioneer in urging that legal education reduce its re-
liance on the case law method of instruction. See generally Louis M. Brown, The
Law Office-A Preventive Law Laboratory, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 940 (1956) [herein-
after Preventive Law Laboratory]. His insight was that when attorneys give private
advice to clients outside the realm of litigation, the attorney is functionally the au-
thoritative source of law: "In the preventive law area of practice the lawyering proc-
ess is final and decisive. There is virtually no appeal from the lawyer's preventive
law decision that his client sign the irrevocable trust, or the deed conveying prop-
erty, or a contract, or engage in numerous other events having legal consequences."
Louis M. Brown, Teaching the Low Visible Decision Processes of the Lawyer, 25 J.
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ments embody detached, objective application of legal rules to histori-
cal factual vignettes. Case judgments clearly articulate legal rules.
Furthermore, their fact patterns offer opportunities for interpreting
those rules and probing the edges of their application. However, the
past tense to which judgments are directed-that is, whether behaviors
were proven that result in legal liability-makes invisible any oppor-
tunities or willingness of the parties to accommodate themselves to the
problem. Efforts or possibilities toward present-tense consensual reso-
lution are not discussed in a typical legal judgment, nor are alternative
possible futures envisioned. The facts reported in a case are immuta-
ble, or "cold." 6 Students are rarely, if ever, prompted to imagine them-
selves as lawyers advising clients prospectively so as to prevent a le-
gal risk from erupting into a full-blown legal problem.
Law teaching, in sum, is mired in the past. To be sure, the recent
growth in skills-based courses in negotiation and mediation is cer-
tainly helpful in advancing students' ability to operate in the present
tense. On the whole, however, students are being offered a consistent
but incomplete approach to law and lawyering. More should be done
for now and the future. By better integrating all three problem solving
modes throughout the curriculum-even in traditional doctrinal
courses-students would gain a fuller and more realistic understand-
ing of how legal problems are actually prevented and resolved by
lawyers. They also would be better positioned to learn the distinct
skills required to be effective in employing each of the three modes of
legal problem solving.
This Essay urges more understanding and use of the alternative
modes of "consent" and "prevention" in legal education. To facilitate
this, Part I explains and contrasts the three modes. Then, Part II offers
specific suggestions for how the alternative modes of consent and pre-
LEGAL EDUC. 386, 387 (1973), quoted in PLANNING BY LAWYERS, supra note 3, at
2. For more recent treatment of ADR in the curriculum, see Symposium, Dispute
Resolution in the Law School Curriculum: Opportunities and Challenges, 50 FLA. L.
REv. 583 (1998).
6. The approach to "prevention" adopted in this Essay builds on Louis Brown's
suggestion that lawyers can be most effective when the facts are still "hot," that is,
malleable. If a client delays speaking with the lawyer until a problem has actually
arisen, the facts may be "cold," says Brown, and the lawyer is relegated to practicing
"curative" rather than "preventive" law. Louis M. Brown, Preventive Law/Curative
Law: Facts (Cold-Hot) Make Difference, 40 J. ST. B. CAL. 258 (1965); Preventive
Law Laboratory, supra note 5, at 940-42.
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vention-the present and future tenses-might be integrated into tra-
ditional doctrinal law school courses.
I. THREE MODES OF LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING: OVERVIEW AND
SIGNIFICANCE
A. The Judgment Mode
The judgment mode for solving legal problems is obviously the
most familiar, reflecting the predominant use of the case method in le-
gal education. In a typical case, the text is a judgment, the culmination
of legal procedures that measure human behavior or institutional ar-
rangements against legal rules or principles. Cases emerge from famil-
iar lawyer skills and strategies: elemental legal analysis applied to fac-
tual research, coupled with strong oral and written advocacy from
lawyers who seek (and typically receive) a winner-take-all solution to
the legal problem. 7
Stepping back a bit from the actual legal activities, the judgment
mode can be seen to work through techniques of separation and reduc-
tion.8 Factual matters that are not directly relevant to the application of
the legal rules are simply pared away, ignored. The judgment inquiry
seeks legal precision, converging on outcomes that have strong truth
claims. 9 Getting there requires distilling the facts into discrete packets
7. For a critique of binary, winner-take-all judgments that typically emanate
from litigation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System
in a Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5 (1996).
8. I first explored the theme of "connection versus separation" in my article
Thomas D. Barton, Troublesome Connections: The Law and Post-Enlightenment
Culture, 47 EMORY L.J. 163 (1998) [hereinafter Barton, Troublesome Connections],
and built on it in Thomas D. Barton, Law and Science in the Enlightenment and Be-
yond, 13 Soc. EPISTEMOLOGY 99 (1999) [hereinafter Barton, Law and Science]. In
the latter work, I posit that the formal procedures of Anglo-American courts evolved
alongside philosophies that sought to secure social order through separating humans
one from another, as well as separating "mind from nature, fact from value, beauty
from utility, reason from belief, law from morality, morality from science, individu-
als from groups, identity from role, and law from science." Barton, Law and Sci-
ence, supra, at 99. Post-enlightenment social values about human connectivity-
reactions against Enlightenment separatist philosophy-are advancing quickly and
may explain some of the recent innovations in ADR methods. Barton, Troublesome
Connections, supra, at 163-66.
9. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 7, at 5-6, 12-16.
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whose boundaries correspond crisply with the criteria or elements em-
bedded in the legal rules. Pairing the contours of the facts cleanly and
parsimoniously with the demands of the rules is the essence of the
analytical thinking so strongly trained in law schools. In contrast, both
the consent and the prevention modes broaden the inquiry, con-
sciously opening toward and connecting to contexts of the problem
that might not be explicitly "legal."' They work through connection
and synthesis rather than separation and reduction. As a result, the
outcomes of both consent-based and prevention-based problem solv-
ing are not necessarily based on legal rules. Similarly, resolutions that
emerge consensually or preventively may take forms that do not cor-
respond with traditional legal remedies. The legal risk or problem may
be addressed through an apology, for instance, coupled with insights
by the parties for improving future communication;" or through sug-
gestions for restructuring communication or dispute resolution within
an organization that would serve better the immediate or future needs
of both parties;' 2 or by other negotiated compromises based on the
parties' preferences.
Nonjudgmental outcomes using alternative modes of problem
solving make softer truth claims than do judicial pronouncements or
arbitral awards. Instead of claiming to have found a right answer, con-
sensual problem solving seeks an answer that is an acceptable ac-
commodation of the parties to their dispute (and hopefully to one an-
other).' 3 Prevention, by further contrast, does not necessarily seek an
"answer" at all. It seeks an understanding of the antecedents of prob-
lems, which in turn may reveal opportunities to make adjustments in
10. See id. at 33-38 (discussing procedures integrating stronger community
discourse).
11. For explorations of the idea of apology and its incorporation into legal
processes, see Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U.
CiN. L. REV. 819 (2002); Elizabeth Latif, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies
Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289 (2001); Lee Taft, On Bended
Knee (with Fingers Crossed), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 601 (2006).
12. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG,
GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED 41-64 (1988).
13. For a description of the "accommodation" style of problem solving and
how it may be used in the legal system, see Thomas D. Barton, Therapeutic Juris-
prudence, Preventive Law, and Creative Problem Solving: An Essay on Harnessing
Emotion and Human Connection, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 921, 924-36 (1999)
[hereinafter Barton, Harnessing Emotion].
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undertakings, communication, or environments that could be helpful
prospectively to the parties. 14
B. The Consent Mode
Outside of law schools, legal problems are often consensually re-
solved through one or more familiar alternative methods of negotia-
tion, mediation, or hybrid processes. ' 5 These consensual approaches to
legal problems are relatively neglected in legal education, although
progress is being made. Virtually all schools now offer basic skills
courses in Negotiations or Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 16
Planning courses in taxation, estates, or business organization are also
commonplace.17 Even in these planning courses, however, the pre-
dominate focus may be on understanding and complying with the le-
gal regulatory environment or achieving a single goal like minimizing
14. My behavioral/environmental approach to preventive thinking is more
completely described in Thomas D. Barton, Thinking Preventively and Proactively,
49 SCANDINAVIAN STUDS. L. 71 (2006) [hereinafter Barton, Thinking Preventively].
Reaching outside of dispute resolution procedures broadens the inquiry even beyond
the quite valuable "systems design" approach that seeks to put into place a variety of
alternative mechanisms for handling disputes. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Democ-
racy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design and the New Workplace, 10 HARv.
NEGOT. L. REV. 11 (2005); URY, BRETT & GOLDBERG, supra note 12. Prevention
addresses risks when they are still susceptible to active management or interven-
tions, before people become embroiled in disputes.
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. These alternative dispute resolu-
tion methods commonly employ connective techniques. Parties may be encouraged
to communicate directly with one another and to participate collaboratively toward
resolving their dispute. In negotiations, the facts and the law may be kept separate or
interweaved, as strategy dictates. Substantively, the parties may be prompted to con-
sider collaborative solutions in which varying interests are simultaneously advanced.
Such "interests"-based negotiation is described in the seminal work of ROGER
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (1981). Among the many works building on theirs are, for example,
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW S. TULUMELLO, BEYOND
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) and
Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotia-
tion, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41 (1985). For useful social science research in negotiation
style and psychology, see DEAN G. PRUITT & PETER J. CARNEVALE, NEGOTIATION
IN SOCIAL CONFLICT (1993).
16. CURRICULUM COMM., ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 7 (2006).
17. See id.
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taxation, rather than on the broader processes by which stakeholders
in an enterprise are identified, their various financial and relational in-
terests uncovered, and the structures arranged so as to satisfy those in-
terests.
The consent mode could also be more explicitly considered in tra-
ditional courses. For example, private contracts are obviously based
on consent of the parties. Most Contract Law courses, however, actu-
ally employ the judgment mode far more than the consent mode in ex-
plicating contractual doctrine.I8 This arises from the strong use of case
reports in Contracts textbooks. Once litigation has occurred, agreed-
upon arrangements between the parties have almost always broken
down. Both instructor and student are left to imagine what efforts
could have avoided the problem, or how the parties mutually could
have adjusted their relationship to resolve an existing dispute. As is
more fully developed below, 19 mock client interviews about the cli-
ent's goals followed by planning and drafting exercises to demonstrate
goal-directed incentives and risk-avoiding clauses would offer oppor-
tunities in a traditional Contracts class to explore both the consent
mode and the prevention mode.
C. The Prevention Mode
The prevention mode is even more rarely discussed explicitly in
legal education, even tlough it-like the consent mode-accounts for
much legal activity. Because of its relative unfamiliarity, I introduce it
here in more detail than the other two modes.
1. Prevention Defined
Acting "preventively" in the behavioral/environmental sense of
this Essay is encouraging or designing a non-aversive environment
that is free from legal liability, physical discomfort or injury, and the
loss of freedom, friendship, finances, or life opportunities. 20 It at-
18. A noteworthy and valuable exception is the relational contracting approach
employed in IAN R. MACNEIL & PAUL J. GUDEL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2001).
19. See infra Part II.B.2.a.
20. Cf B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 26-43 (1971) (empha-
sizing design of non-punishing environments, rather than seeking subjective feelings
395
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tempts to prevent a punishing environment, seeking instead to create
conditions under which clients can achieve their legitimate goals effi-
ciently and effectively. Preventive design is illustrated by consumer
products that are engineered to avoid using small detachable parts that
toddlers could swallow or automobiles that will not catch fire if rear-
ended. Organizations can also be designed preventively. For example,
workplaces may incorporate safety devices that prohibit operation of
potentially dangerous equipment except in certain prescribed ways. 1
Less tangibly, prevention may be advanced in workplaces by training
employees so as to reduce behaviors that would offend the civil rights
or sensibilities of fellow workers. 22 More broadly, virtually all per-
sonal relationships can be "designed" or shaped to include activities or
styles of communicating that promote mutual understanding and re-
gard.23
of personal freedom).
21. Professor Edward A. Dauer recalls, however, a cautionary story from his
youth. Heavy stamping machines for pressing jewelry parts represented an obvious
risk to their operators if an operator's hand were to slip under the powerful blocks as
they pounded sheet metals. To prevent this from happening, the machines were de-
signed to operate only when two widely separated buttons were pushed simultane-
ously. The expectation was that both of an operator's hands would have to be on the
buttons (and thus away from the pounding blocks) whenever the machine was actu-
ally stamping metal. However, the machine's designers failed to consider broadly
enough all elements of the human environment in which the machines were used.
The workers were paid "piecemeal" for their work, creating a strong financial incen-
tive for fast operation of the machines. As a consequence, the operators would rou-
tinely tape down one of the two operating buttons in the "on" position so that one of
their hands would remain free to move metal quickly in and out of the stamping
process, and thus render that hand susceptible to being crushed. Viewing the physi-
cal and financial elements of this system together, one can see how their conflicting
aims led to injuries that a more comprehensive systemic thinking would have
avoided. Edward A. Dauer, Class Lecture in Problem Solving and Preventive Law at
California Western School of Law (Spring 2006).
22. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, such training
efforts are rewarded with reduced penalties in the event of a violation. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.8(a)(10) (2006) (referring to 18 U.S.C. §
3572(a)(8) (2000) (stating that, in determining the amount of a fine, the court must
consider "any measure taken by the organization to ... prevent a recurrence of such
offense")).
23. See, e.g., ARTHUR L. ROBIN & SHARON L. FOSTER, NEGOTIATING PARENT-
ADOLESCENT CONFLICT: A BEHAVIORAL-FAMILY SYSTEMS APPROACH (1989) (out-
lining a behavioral approach to adolescent communication).
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The prevention mode also pervades constitutions. For example,
political systems can be designed to require open deliberations which
promote transparent decision making and discourage corruption. 24
More structurally, constitutions like that of the United States create
cross-cutting institutional powers that constrain overreaching by bal-
ancing the operations of each institution against the others. Further,
periodic elections and term limits for holding office can be mandated
so as to prevent extremism and power-grabbing. 26
At the highest level of generality, designing clear criteria or pro-
cedures for almost any potentially competitive human interaction will
help to prevent unfairness and bad feelings. 27 Setting defaults and en-
titlements can also prevent hard feelings and inefficiency.2 8 If starting
points or presumptions are not clearly established, negotiation will
24. See, e.g., Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54953(a) (West 2006)
(requiring open meetings for local agencies in California).
25. Division of powers alone, of course, does not necessarily secure the rule of
law. Professor Richard A. Epstein explores the interplay of constitutional structural-
ism and civic republicanism in his article Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and
Constitutional Structure, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 149 (1987).
26. This may be more apparent in theory than reality, however. Elizabeth Gar-
ret offers a healthy skepticism about whether legal term limits on political office will
greatly reduce the ranks of the professional politician. Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limi-
tations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. Rev. 623 (1996).
27. Moral/psychological clarity, however, may differ from legal clarity. One
interesting study tested separate groups of practicing lawyers, undergraduate busi-
ness students, and graduate business students for their perceptions about the legal
and moral existence of job security in response to the language contained in a hypo-
thetical employee handbook. Deborah A. Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks,
Contract Formation and Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and Empiri-
cal Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 647 (1994). Variables in the language pro-
vided to the subjects included verb strength, specificity of language, jargon, dis-
claimers, and the presence or absence of a signature block whereby the subject
would acknowledge having read the handbook passages. Id. at 671-73. The authors
argued for the idea that a "contract" can be either legal, psychological, or implied.
Psychological or implied contracts are those not necessarily recognized legally, but
"constructs defined and studied by scholars of organizational behavior." Id. at 649.
28. For a classic explanation of the relationship between secure entitlements
and efficiency in negotiation, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 1089, 1090-92 (1972).
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proceed clumsily because no one is certain which party must be com-
pensated and which party must pay.29
Prevention efforts by lawyers can sometimes be very simple, like
including a clause in a contract that establishes or disclaims warran-
ties. This sets the initial entitlement about quality or durability risks of
a product or service. As mentioned above, clarity in describing the
scope of that initial right is an important first step in avoiding later
disagreements.
Effective prevention, however, goes beyond the language written
into the contract. Prevention is better conceived in the broader con-
texts of real-life systems in which people interact with one another
and with the objects and spaces of the physical world. Consider the
warranty clause example more thoroughly. If we ask ourselves (as a
good attorney would) how a manufacturing client might most effec-
tively be protected by a disclaimer of warranties, we would of course
begin by ensuring that the contract clause is clearly expressed, com-
plying with any necessary Uniform Commercial Code language. But
then we should also imagine the ways in which the products will be
used. This is the step not always taken by lawyers, who may be
trained to believe that clear, strong contract provisions will suffice to
serve a client. As Brown and Dauer suggest, good lawyering predicts
not only how a court will behave, but also "how people will be-
have." 30 Serving the client more fully would entail taking proactive
measures to prompt proper use of the product through clear instruction
sheets addressed to the consumer that would accompany shipment of
the product. Furthermore, warning labels on the product itself, with
pictures or diagrams, should alert people to unsafe uses. A consumer
hotline or web e-mail system can be constructed to elicit feedback
about the strengths and weaknesses of the product, which can then be
used to improve the utility or safety of the device. Such communica-
tion can also supply early warnings of unanticipated (but perhaps fore-
seeable) product uses. With enough lead time, retrofits or additional
advice about proper usage in such instances might be feasible. The
feedback loop is thus used to refine the preventive measures.
29. See id. at 1092-93.
30. PLANNING BY LAWYERS, supra note 3, at 309.
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The broader point of prevention is to keep lawsuits from occur-
ring, not simply to position one's clients to win lawsuits. 31 Legal rules
can help to deter unwanted conduct. But legal rules and goals are me-
diated by human motivations, emotions, incentives, constraints, and
informal institutional norms. The environments in which legal rules
are applied can be complex and unpredictable. 32 Lawyers can serve
their clients more fully by understanding and helping to shape those
environments.
2. Prevention and Systems Thinking
In applying legal rules preventively to the environments in which
they will operate, systems thinking can be helpful. 33 Systems are sim-
ply collections of elements or components that interact regularly: peo-
ple, rules, information, ways of communicating, and physical envi-
ronments. 34 Systems may arise spontaneously, as in many natural
processes or the development of some markets of exchange. 35 Alterna-
tively, systems may be consciously designed to produce desired out-
comes.
36
Preventive thinking and design inherently force consideration of
the contexts in which legal rules operate: the social, emotional, politi-
cal, financial, and physical environments. Anticipating how well legal
rules will actually work depends on understanding the systemic inter-
actions to which the legal rules will be applied.37
31. James G. Frierson, Pre-Action Advice May Not Be Preventive Law Advice,
http://preventivelawyer.org/contentlessays/frierson.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
32. As pointed out long ago by Professor Lon Fuller, problems differ in their
difficulty or manageability. One important dimension making problems more resis-
tant to solution is instability or variability in background conditions. Lon L. Fuller,
Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (1965).
33. For a comprehensive overview of systems thinking in dispute resolution,
see KARL A. SLAIKEU & RALPH H. HASSON, CONTROLLING THE COSTS OF
CONFLICT: HOW TO DESIGN A SYSTEM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION (1998).
34. See ROBERT L. FLOOD & MICHAEL C. JACKSON, CREATIVE PROBLEM
SOLVING: TOTAL SYSTEMS INTERVENTION 3-6 (1991).
35. See id. at 5.
36. Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regula-
tion, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 347, 358 (2005).
37. Using examples from anthropological research, Sally Falk Moore illus-
trates how proclaimed legal rules can be limited in effectiveness, or even rendered
399
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To accomplish that more applied and predictive understanding of
legal rules requires more connective, and less separationist, thinking
than is typically employed using the judgment mode.38 As described
above, the judgment mode commonly employs linear, analytical rea-
soning with facts being relevant only to the extent that they bear on
the predefined elements of the rules. 39 Contextual information not
bearing directly on the tests set up by the legal elements is simply not
considered. In contrast, preventive thinking looks for, and attempts to
understand, connections among laws and various components of the
social or physical environment. Preventive thinking builds out the sys-
tem. 4
0
D. The Significance of the Three Modes: Why Does It Matter?
Much more can be said about the differences among the three
modes of legal problem solving. That awaits another essay. This Essay
seeks simply to introduce a vocabulary about the three modes so as to
urge stronger classroom use of the consent and prevention modes. Be-
fore moving to the techniques by which the alternative modes might
be integrated, however, we should stop to ask why it matters. Legal
education has for decades successfully employed the judgment mode
to explicate legal doctrine and sharpen analytical abilities of students.
Why should we now divert our attention toward opening up law teach-
ing to stronger, more explicit consideration of the consent and preven-
tion modes?
counterproductive, when the legal rules are introduced into cultural or organizational
settings with prevailing cultural norms or patterns of organization that are antitheti-
cal to the aims sought by the laws. SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 58-65 (1983).
38. Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-
and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Ad-
ministrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 852-59, 893-99 (1996) (urging a systems-
based understanding of the relationship between law and society); Steven D. Smith,
Reductionism in Legal Thought, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 68 (1991) (calling for a nonre-
ductionist approach to the multiple functions served by law).
39. See supra Part I.A.
40. See FLOOD & JACKSON, supra note 34, at 5-7 (conceptualizing systems not
as disconnected or self-contained elements, but rather as elements relating in diverse
ways to each other).
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Three reasons justify greater attention to the alternative modes.
The first reason was discussed at the outset of this Essay: that the ma-
jority of legal issues are actually resolved by consent or prevention.
Students should better understand and be better equipped for ap-
proaching legal issues as they are actually addressed (or abandoned).
The other two reasons are considered at some length in the paragraphs
below. The first of those remaining reasons is that the outcomes of le-
gal problems may change depending on the mode through which they
are processed. This has both jurisprudential significance and strategic
implications for how lawyering skills are employed. The final justifi-
cation for stronger consideration of the alternative modes of legal
problem solving is that exclusive use of the judgment mode in teach-
ing may reinforce an overly narrow social mentality. That, in turn,
may also narrow the professional identity of lawyers and the goals
they seek.
1. Outcomes May Differ Depending on the Mode
Used for Problem Solving
The outcomes or solutions of a problem may change, depending
on which mode of legal problem solving is employed in attempting its
resolution.4 1 This can be shown in class with many of the cases that
appear in legal casebooks by walking students through the "recasting"
teaching strategy described further in Part II of this Essay. In brief,
take a legal issue described in a textbook case. The judgment authori-
tatively declares or applies a legal rule. Then simulate a resolution of
that same issue by the parties who appear in the reported case, using
the consent mode. A different legal outcome (or several of them) may
be suggested that plausibly better serves the interests of the parties.
If changing legal processes really can change outcomes, then by
working through alternative processes students may discover a more
subtle, reciprocal relationship between legal rules and the social envi-
41. This point differs from and does not depend on "rule skepticism," the idea
that legal rules are not the best predictors of decisions or outcomes even where the
case is being judged using traditional court procedures. See H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 133-35 (1961) (contrasting rule skepticism and formalism). Re-
gardless of what may best predict courtroom decisions, my thesis here is simply that
different outcomes are possible (even likely) where mediation or negotiation are
used instead of the procedures leading to court judgments.
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ronment. Furthermore, limits to the instrumental use or understanding
of legal rules may also be revealed.4 2 This is especially important in
considering legislation. The effectiveness of a legislated scheme will
be mediated by the social system in which the legislation must oper-
ate.43 If various financial incentives or cultural beliefs push against the
legislated legal outcome, the actual result of the legislation may be far
less than intended, or even counterproductive.
The alternative modes of legal problem solving become strategi-
cally important because different lawyering techniques may be appro-
priate depending on whether a problem has fully erupted into losses,
or whether the problem is as yet only at the risk level. If a problem is
still at the risk level, then factual environments still can be shaped to
prevent the emergence of problems, or at least to limit the damage.44
In contrast, where a full-blown problem has emerged and costs al-
ready incurred, the lawyer's options are reduced.
2. Avoiding Simplifying Social Assumptions45
The second justification for including a stronger consideration of
all three problem solving modes in legal education is humanistic.
Thinking through all three modes, even if only occasionally, will sof-
ten the two simplifying assumptions discussed below that tend to ac-
company an overreliance on the judgment mode.
a. Assumption 1: People exist largely in isolation from one an-
other, living their lives through autonomous informed choices rather
than through the bonds of love, tradition, honor, or spirituality.46
42. See James Boyd White, Imagining the Law, in THE RHETORIC OF LAW 29,
29-38 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994) (resisting the instrumentalist
understanding of the law and instead imagining the law as rhetoric, a process of hu-
man dialogue).
43. MOORE, supra note 37, at 58.
44. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
45. See generally Thomas D. Barton, Creative Problem Solving: Purpose,
Meaning, and Values, 34 CAL. W. L. REv. 273, 285 (1998) [hereinafter Barton,
Creative Problem Solving] (discussing how the image of humanity is reduced within
the legal system so as to fit within the law's limited tools for investigation and as-
sessment of human motives and behavior).
46. Id.; cf GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS (1993) (noting neglect by the law of the idea and influence of loy-
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The judgment mode reinforces this first simplifying assumption
through its heavy reliance on adversarial procedures and the legal
rules which underpin a judgment's legitimacy. The rights and duties
embedded in legal rules are typically held individually. They are not,
in other words, analyzed as though they were held relationally among
groups of individuals (like tenants in common or agent/principal), or
within families (like the rules of intestacy), or collectively within
groups or communities (like Constitutional rules about federalism or
division of powers among the branches of government).47 In other
words, legal decisions that emerge from the judgment mode typically
assume that rights are not contingent on the approval of surrounding
family or community members. Hence the participation or interests of
both family and the public are generally marginal to the problem solv-
ing notwithstanding that those persons may actually be dramatically
affected by a legal decision. Quite to the contrary, apart from family
law cases or those in which consortium damages or character evidence
may be relevant, formally bringing the concerns or opinions of family
or community members into civil litigation processes would likely be
considered disruptive. Even to suggest putting on such testimony
would, in most trials, be regarded as preposterous and reflective of an
incompetent or quixotic attorney.
In contrast, dealing with the same legal problem through consent-
mode procedures can open up the decision making to the interests of
those persons. The problem holder may consult and regard those per-
sons as he or she chooses in coming to a resolution of the problem.
Dealing with the legal problem preventively may also be more in-
clusive of family or community views. The preventive lawyer would
understand family pressures, for example, as part of the social context
in which legal rules or purported solutions operate. If the realities of
such influences are ignored, any proposed or imposed legal solution
may be ineffective and the problem may recur needlessly. Attempting
to find out the likely views of family members would permit predic-
tion of how they might support or sabotage particular legal solutions.
Good preventive design packages its solutions together with explana-
alty); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND
CULTURE (1990) (discussing the intensity with which Americans seek to preserve
and expand individual choice).
47. Barton, Troublesome Connections, supra note 8, at 170-72.
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tions and incentives for family members to support the legal solution.
Emotions and relationships that are part of the social world can either
reinforce or undermine legal solutions to problems. The legal system
need not forego opportunities to be more effective, as well as more re-
spectful of the ties and impulses that people have toward one another.
The other aspect of this first simplifying assumption is the propo-
sition that people care far more about autonomy and choice than about
the sentiments that bond them to other individuals or groups. In tradi-
tional litigation, individual actions are assessed against a standard of
personal free agency and detached rationality. Rarely are formal legal
judgments and accountability affected by the relational, ethnic, or re-
ligious ties of the parties. The "cultural defense" against criminal
prosecution, for example, remains highly controversial.4 8
The values underlying this first simplifying assumption are un-
doubtedly worthy. They stress individuality and moral autonomy.
They presume a fundamental equality among people who are subjects
of the law. This ideal of a color-blind equal protection and application
of the law is unquestionably wise, unifying, practical, and even moral.
Most people in our culture are willing to defend this basically egalitar-
ian understanding of the rule of law. I have in other works strongly de-
fended these values. 49 Nonetheless, we should be aware that the vision
of humanity thereby portrayed is incomplete. Moral, social, and politi-
cal pressures are actually experienced by people that differentially in-
fluence the meaning, impact, and onerousness of the law. Such rela-
48. For descriptions and analysis of the cultural defense, see Daina Chiu, The
Cultural Defense: Beyond Exclusion, Assimilation, and Guilty Liberalism, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 1053 (1994); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through
Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Deirdre
Evans-Pritchard & Alison Dundes Renteln, The Interpretation and Distortion of
Culture: A Hmong "Marriage by Capture" Case in Fresno, California, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1995); Alison Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural De-
fense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 437 (1993); Austin
Sarat & Roger Berkowitz, Disorderly Differences: Recognition, Accommodation,
and American Law, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 285 (1994); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying
Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57
(1994).
49. See, e.g., Thomas D. Barton, Liberalism and Theories of Adjudication, 28
B.C. L. REV. 625 (1987); Thomas D. Barton, Fears and Conflicts, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1425 (1985) (reviewing GOTTFRIED DIETZE, LIBERALISM PROPER AND PROPER
LIBERALISM (1985)).
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tional and heritage influences, however, are marginal to the judgment
mode of the legal process.
The consent and prevention modes can more easily incorporate
social realities of difference. In the consent mode, the problem holders
themselves decide the issues. People are thus free to accord whatever
significance they choose to personal, historical, or ethnic ties. Because
people are not bound to follow formal, evenhanded legal rules, people
can functionally adopt different standards for different sensibilities.
Functionally, the consent mode permits legal pluralism.
Similarly, lawyers working in the prevention mode can attempt to
anticipate these impulses, taking into account the reception that a legal
rule or solution would meet among different groups. Consider the ex-
ample of recent Western efforts to extend ideas of transparency, gov-
ernmental accountability, and democratic practices to parts of the
world that are accustomed to winner-take-all politics. 50 A preventive
approach would attempt to tailor the reform institutions particularly to
each receiving culture, so as to symbolically appeal to that culture.
The preventive approach would recognize that successful reforms best
take hold when attempts are made to reconcile the reforms with centu-
ries-old symbolic institutions and cultural understandings about truth,
authority, and the sources of legitimacy.5' Preventive design would
understand pragmatically that the functions of limited government
may sometimes be possible only through structures that look very dif-
ferent from those that work well within our own cultural traditions.
b. Assumption 2: In resolving their problems, people seek valida-
tion through legal judgments that pronounce one person to have been
right and the other person to have been wrong. 52
This second simplifying assumption is highlighted by the regular-
ity of formal legal procedures and the limited remedies that are avail-
50. See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform As-
sistance Under Post-Communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL.
327 (calling for more attention to individual differences among countries in democ-
ratic reform efforts).
51. Cf. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE
IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY (1989) (describing the integration of modem judicial institu-
tions with traditional qadi justice).
52. Barton, Creative Problem Solving, supra note 45, at 285; see also Barton,
Harnessing Emotion, supra note 13, at 929.
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able to courts. The legal system is not well designed to work with the
diverse motives for people launching lawsuits against one another, es-
pecially in noncommercial suits.53 How often are lawsuits filed that
are motivated more by hurt personal feelings accompanying a breach
of legal rights, than by the legal rights themselves? How much more
efficient could the legal system be, and how much stronger could both
legal remedies and personal relationships be, if the legal system incor-
porated better measures for counseling the antagonists in a prospective
legal action?
Once problems reach formal adjudication, the official possibilities
of apology, forgiveness, or reciprocal acknowledgment are few. 54
Common law remedies and even equitable remedies neglect solutions
based on mutual accommodation between the contending parties. By
contrast, the consent mode opens up a diverse range of options for
how people can come to a satisfactory resolution of a dispute. In
community-based or facilitative-style mediation, for example, the me-
diator's role is to help the parties find their own solution to a prob-
lem. 55 The mediator might suggest areas of life for the parties to ex-
plore, but the mediator would be inappropriately overstepping to
suggest a particular outcome. Giving people the experience of under-
standing others and accommodating their needs is an intended by-
product of many mediations. 56 Broader yet, the prevention mode sug-
gests that people can take pride from constructing a world which seeks
to facilitate and enable others, rather than procedures that seek to do-
mesticate and channel personal conflict.
The simplifying assumptions advanced by the judgment mode are
not very realistic. Yet we rarely stop to consider them. That is because
53. See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING
EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990) (de-
scribing the frustrations of working-class people in attempting to summon the assis-
tance of the legal system in resolving their interpersonal problems).
54. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
55. KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 16-17,
28-29 (1994).
56. Patricia L. Franz, Habits of a Highly Effective Transformative Mediation
Program, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1039, 1044-45 (1998).
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when operating in the judgment mode, the law (unlike psychology, for
example) can rely solely on tools of problem solving based on power
rather than based on consent, reciprocity, emotion, or the bonds of
human relationship. 57 The law can summon the formidable power of
the state to enforce its resolutions. Psychology cannot.5 8 Lacking such
power, practitioners of psychology must understand and harness per-
sonal emotion and relationships. 59 This goes far toward explaining
therapeutic practices, just as the ready availability of state power goes
far toward explaining formal legal procedures. However, relying too
heavily on the simplifying assumptions about people and their prob-
lems can produce outcomes that are artificially easy: solutions that fo-
cus more on finding someone to blame and vindicating the legitimacy
of the legal rules than on encouraging mutual understanding and ac-
commodation and on redesigning the antecedents of a problem so as
to prevent its recurrence.
II. WHAT TO Do ABOUT THE THREE MODES: STRATEGIES FOR
INCORPORATING THE CONSENT AND PREVENTION MODES INTO
EXISTING CLASSES
60
In this Part, I suggest two distinct strategies for better incorporat-
ing the consent and prevention modes into doctrinal law teaching.
These are (A) moving back and forth among the three modes in class
discussion, depending on the particular doctrinal or factual issues
raised in assigned readings, and (B) using a simulated "recasting" of
the textbook cases to illustrate one or both of the alternative modes.
A. Shifting Modes of Discussion According to the Problem Presented
This first strategy assumes that all three modes of legal problem
solving can be discussed not only in the same course, but also in the
context of a single textbook case. An initial foundation must be laid,
of course, for students to understand the distinctions among the three
57. Barton, Harnessing Emotion, supra note 13, at 923, 927-28.
58. Id. at 927.
59. Id.
60. Although the examples have been changed, the strategies for incorporating
alternative modes are built on discussion in Barton, Curriculum, supra note *, at 3-
11.
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modes. Having done that once-even in a twenty-minute discussion
that sketches the distinctive modes and their characteristic tenses-
any given doctrine or aspect of a course can thereafter be discussed
using the mode that best explores the doctrine or topic.
Knowing which mode to prompt for discussion need not be diffi-
cult. Particular problems or topics that are treated by legal rules pos-
sess certain attributes that prompt analysis through the consent or pre-
vention modes. The paragraphs that follow offer some questions that
probe the appropriateness of using a particular mode in discussing a
certain topic in the law.
1. The Consent Mode
In considering a particular aspect of legal doctrine, ask the follow-
ing questions:
a. Does this doctrinal issue often arise out of intense or long-
standing personal relationships? If so, the consent mode may be espe-
cially appropriate. This is because, when problems are strongly em-
bedded in relationships of friendship or intimacy, how people think
and behave, and what they value morally, may not correspond well
with the elements of the legal doctrine. Previewing a technique that is
more fully described below, 61 if the assigned reading introducing this
particular legal doctrine is a reported case, work directly with that
case: Did the factual incident that gave rise to this particular lawsuit
seem to be precipitated by a series of personal interactions involving
blame on both sides? If so, did the court refer explicitly to that rela-
tional history? Or is the reader left to infer it from other reported cir-
cumstances? Does the density and ambiguity of the relationship seem
to have affected the legal judgment? Should it have? Then prompt
students' imaginations about the conversations that might unfold if the
parties to this lawsuit were to employ the consent mode for their legal
problem. Compare and contrast the arguments, entreaties, and possible
accommodations offered by the students with the rationale of the
court-issued judgment.
b. Are strong emotions often associated with the human problem
to which the legal doctrine is addressed? If so, how may those emo-
tions influence a decision to take the problem to litigation? May it be
61. See infra Part II.B.1.
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that anger or jealousy can find no better outlet? What if some alterna-
tive way of spending or resolving the emotions was found? What if, in
a given case, the emotions are based on a misunderstanding? Might
that misunderstanding be resolved through better communication? Do
conversations about liability and blameworthiness just make those
emotions or misunderstandings more intense? What alternative ques-
tions could be asked other than those posed by legal rules, and with
what results?
c. Do traditional legal remedies fail to resolve satisfactorily this
human problem? This is a very practical concern, and again it can be
an invitation to consider a topic through an alternative mode. If tradi-
tional legal methods flounder in constructing an effective remedy,
then what different remedies might become available by solving the
problem through an alternative mode? Legal remedies depend on
power, as suggested above.62 Where the power is insufficient or too
expensive to fix a problem, a remedy based on reciprocity, coopera-
tion, or mutual regard might work better.
If any of the above questions are answered affirmatively, then an
important jurisprudential point can likely be made about the particular
legal doctrine at issue. Look carefully at the history and application of
the legal rules: Can we find embedded in the elements of the rules, or
in their historic application, an explicit or tacit acknowledgment that
winner-take-all judgments are not completely appropriate when con-
fronting this area of the law? For example: historically, does this as-
pect of legal doctrine employ equitable remedies? Are the basic legal
rules peppered with exceptions, or legal fictions? 63 Are the legal rules
interpreted with especial elasticity? Does this doctrine invoke specific
references to broad notions like justice or fairness as a criterion for in-
voking the rule or fashioning a remedy? Have the subjective intentions
of the parties been incorporated formally into an element of the legal
rule? Does the court keep ongoing jurisdiction in the matter, requiring
periodic review and possible adjustment of the resolution? All of these
devices enable formal adjudication to respond to a problem that actu-
ally may be better suited to resolution through the consent mode.64
62. See supra Part I.D.2.b.
63. See generally LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967) (describing legal
fictions and the functions they serve in stabilizing the legal system).
64. See Thomas Barton, Justiciability: A Theory of Judicial Problem Solving,
24 B.C. L. REv. 505 (1983) (suggesting a set of variables for both problems and pro-
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Whenever the judgment mode is used to resolve a problem whose
structural features suggest that the consent mode is more appropriate,
we should expect to find in the substantive doctrine one or more fea-
tures like resort to equity, doctrinal exceptions, a history of widely
varying interpretations, or subjectivity that soften the binary tenden-
cies of the judgment mode.
2. The Prevention Mode
As with the consent mode, instructors may identify doctrinal is-
sues that may be especially appropriate for prevention mode treatment
by asking a series of questions:
a. Does the problem associated with this legal doctrine involve
ongoing management rather than a single permanent resolution? If so,
the risk of a recurring problem is high, and the prevention mode is
more strongly suggested.
b. Is the precise nature of the problem shrouded, or does it involve
long-term issues where personnel or background conditions are likely
to change? 65 If so, then the prevention mode is suggested because a
single judgment that is "one-size-fits all, for all time" is not likely to
work. Even if the doctrine is appropriate for one fact pattern, it may be
clumsy for future iterations of the problem.
c. Does the problem entail trade-offs among many variables, 66 es-
pecially variables that are not easily reduced to uniform measures
upon which formal operations (like arithmetic) can be performed? 67 If
so, then preventing the problem from arising has a special importance,
because legal judgments are less likely to resolve the problem accu-
rately or satisfactorily.
d. Does the problem involve both transactions and relational com-
ponents, such as business franchises, partnership arrangements, or
transfers of property within families? If so, then the preventive system
design can incorporate incentives, education, and structured commu-
cedures, and identifying methods by which the common law modifies either the
problem or its own procedures, when confronting problems that are structurally un-
usual).
65. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 32, at 1034-35.
66. See, e.g., id. at 1035-36.
67. See Laurence H. Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinu-
ity: The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 625-30 (1973).
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nications that will take these relationships and human dynamics more
fully into account.
Whenever the prevention mode is strongly suggested for under-
standing a human problem, recommend to students that they use a
special method for examining the existing legal rules pertaining to that
problem.68 Encourage the students to try to describe a system in which
humans interact among themselves and with a surrounding nonsocial
environment. The dynamics revealed by thinking about various ele-
ments in such a system can help students understand the rationale and
also the limitations of the legal rules. What sort of information is
needed within the system and by whom? How may it be obtained?
How is the needed information represented and processed? Can the
system be better designed for discovering and processing that infor-
mation? Does the system tend to degrade? To stagnate? Can better
feedback mechanisms be incorporated to ensure that the system func-
tions better over time? By identifying the elements of the system and
their typical (or mandated) interactions, a deeper understanding is
gained not only of the current legal treatment of this ongoing human
problem, but also of the preventive advice that might be supplied to a
client as well.
B. Exercises That Illustrate an Expanded Skillset
Some easy in-class exercises can be done to enhance student
awareness of the alternative modes of problem solving. These exer-
cises do not take more than a couple of classes in a semester; hence,
they need not compromise coverage of legal doctrine. The exercises
are also simple, requiring very little time to be spent in advance by the
instructor. Finally, the instructor should not be deterred by limited ex-
perience with teaching the lawyer skills that are associated with either
the consent or prevention modes. These exercises are designed simply
to alert students to the existence of the alternative possible modes of
legal problem solving through comparing the outcomes of a problem
using first the judgment mode and then one of the alternatives.
The exercises take advantage of the different tenses in which the
modes operate. 69 As introduced above, the past tense is associated
68. Barton, Thinking Preventively, supra note 14, at 84-91.
69. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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with the judgment mode; the present tense with the consent mode; and
the future tense with the prevention mode (although a "present tense"
consent mode agreement can also operate prospectively to preempt
new controversies). The judgment mode seeks to map the criteria of
legal rules onto historical facts so as to determine liability. Consent,
by contrast, reveals the current interests of the parties. Prevention pro-
jects legal risks outward into various possible scenarios, seeking cur-
rent ways to intervene that will enable the system to self-correct be-
fore significant damage is done. Casebooks strongly orient problem
solving toward the past, using the judgment mode. To overcome this,
students can be placed artificially into the present tense to illustrate
lawyer skills that are useful in the consent mode. Alternatively, they
can be placed in the future tense to illustrate lawyer skills that are use-
ful in the prevention mode.
Rather than drafting hypothetical fact patterns, the instructor can
"shift the tense" of the students by recasting the facts of a case that
appears in the casebook. Not only does using the facts of a reported
case save time, but it also may demonstrate vividly the different legal
outcomes that can emerge from using different problem solving
modes.
Many cases in traditional casebooks may be valuably recast into
the present or future tense. Promising candidates for recasting are
those cases in which the law seems especially doubtful or controver-
sial, or where both parties to the dispute seem to have suffered finan-
cially, emotionally, or relationally, even though one party has tri-
umphed in the judgment mode. In the paragraphs below, I offer more
detailed suggestions on how this "tense recasting" can be done.
1. Recasting into the Consent Mode (Present Tense)
To do the recasting into the present tense of the consent mode,
first discuss the case in a traditional way, explicating the legal doctrine
and the judgment made on the particular facts. Then, "rewind the
tape" a bit. Ask the students to assume that although the problem has
occurred, no legal claim has yet been filed. The purpose of this tense
shift is to permit the students to consider broader, more imaginative
sorts of solutions in addition to the traditional legal solutions. In par-
ticular, instruct the students that with a consensual solution, no legal
judgment need be pronounced, nor money remedy imposed. Then ask
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the students to role-play in class the attorneys for the parties who may
be trying to negotiate a solution to the problem. This can be done in-
formally with the students pairing off or forming small discussion
groups.
Have students share their diverging results with the rest of the
class. The outcomes of the consent process should be compared and
evaluated against the judgment-based remedy reported in the case-
book. Students should also be prompted to recognize the differing
skills or questions asked that led to those differing outcomes.
2. Recasting into the Prevention Mode (Future Tense)
The prevention mode can be invoked by first rewinding the case
history even further, to a point prior even to the loss or eruption of the
problem. Students should then imagine themselves in the position of
an attorney with the luxury of being consulted regularly by a client
who may or may not perceive this particular risk that was destined to
emerge into a problem requiring litigation. The students should articu-
late observable warning signs that may have been visible at an early
stage regarding the client's organization, contracting partners, or fam-
ily. From the imaginary position of an early counseling of the client,
the students should address what as yet is merely a legal risk. They
should be prompted to envision alternative futures from those that ac-
tually arose. They should then devise immediate ways to intervene so
as to alter the problematic trajectory and counsel a simulated client on
the steps to be taken. Here are three possible examples from subjects
typically addressed in first-year classes:
a. Contract Law
Virtually any case involving the breach of a fully negotiated
agreement can be used. Following the traditional doctrinal discussion
of the case, break the students into negotiating teams. Tell the students
that sometime prior to the next class meeting, they are to negotiate a
contract that will:
i. Avoid a breach through contract language that is clearer than the
language that resulted in litigation.
ii. Avoid a breach by structuring better incentives in the contract
for each party to perform.
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iii. Avoid litigation even if there is a breach, by inserting into the
contract any of the following clauses: a force majeure clause that ex-
cuses performance under various conditions; a clause that requires
prompt notification of dissatisfaction; a clause that mandates informal
procedures to be followed in the event that dissatisfaction cannot be
resolved immediately; and a valid liquidated damages clause.
b. Property Law
The following example is especially practical, but at the same
time requires the students to reflect imaginatively on human motiva-
tions. Have the students work in teams of two in which they role-play
a City Attorney. They should assume that the city council has man-
dated that a percentage of any newly constructed housing in the city
will be "affordable" under a formula tied to the median income of city
residents. The affordable housing must be fairly distributed around the
city, not centralized into one neighborhood. The students should as-
sume that significant opposition from residents can be expected wher-
ever new affordable housing will be built in an otherwise higher-
priced neighborhood. The Planning Department seeks advice from the
City Attorney about how to set up the affordable housing program that
would avoid expensive and obstructive lawsuits from disgruntled
neighbors, and that also would ensure that only economically deserv-
ing persons would be able to obtain and remain in the designated af-
fordable housing.
The students should work out of class:
i. To suggest procedures for determining how new housing can be
integrated into both older and newer neighborhoods.
ii. To create financial or other incentives for builders, occupants,
and neighbors regarding the new housing.
iii. To prevent resale or subleasing of the housing to persons
whose income or wealth does not qualify them for such housing.
iv. To license or otherwise ensure that proposed housing actually
meets the original objectives.
v. To receive and review community complaints and responses to
the program.
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c. Torts/Products Liability
Following a casebook problem about products liability, have the
students break into small groups to imagine all the distinct points in
the system of design, production, distribution, sales, and use of a
product at which interventions could be made to reduce the risks of
product liability. Each point of intervention presents an opportunity
for designing an intervention that would help to break a pathological
problem dynamic. Discussion should reveal issues and opportunities
like the following:
i. Were the original specifications for the product overly specific,
so that alternative design features could not be considered where risks
might have been foreseen? Do the designs reflect technological state
of the art respecting these risks? Have alternative designs been sub-
mitted by separate people, with their strengths and weaknesses objec-
tively debated?
ii. Have reliable component and materials suppliers been used and
adequate quality assurance steps taken?
iii. Has each product, or at least a random sampling, been tested
for functionality and durability?
iv. Has the sales force made imprudent written or oral representa-
tions? What systems are in place for preventing such promises or de-
scriptions from becoming part of the contract?
v. Do managers have incentives to ignore quality problems, or in-
stead to find risks and respond quickly to them?
vi. Do consumers or users of the product have adequate warnings
and/or training for its use?
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment mode is unquestionably effective in addressing
many legal problems. As authors of legal texts have understood for
decades, it also offers a useful vehicle for understanding legal doc-
trine. However, not all legal problems are actually resolved by au-
thoritative judgment. Furthermore, some legal doctrine can be more
richly understood by discussing it using the assumptions and features
of either the consent mode or the prevention mode.
By understanding better how these three modes of legal problem
solving differ one from another, law students can gain a more com-
prehensive appreciation of the legal system as a whole, especially its
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task of solving a broad range of human problems. The alternative
modes can be employed in either traditional class discussion or in
simulated recastings of textbook cases. In both discussion and simula-
tions, the students should be prompted to imagine a broad range of
skills that can be pertinent to lawyering. They should imagine them-
selves speaking more broadly and frequently with clients, to widen
and deepen the contexts in which legal problems are understood. They
should also endeavor to think systemically about how problems arise,
so that problem antecedents can be comprehensively identified. Fi-
nally, they should be prompted to use their imaginations in proposing
interventions that will smooth existing frictions, to create multiple
channels of communication so that future dissonance is reduced, and
to assist in the efficient, effective resolution of problems that do arise.
